Studies in Income and Wealth by David Kosh
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National
Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: Studies in Income and Wealth





Chapter Title: Tangible Assets of Public Utilities
Chapter Author: David Kosh
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c3148




Treasury DepartmentA REGULATiON AND PUBLIC UTiLiTY VALUE
A unique economic characteristic of public utilities is the
regulation of their operations, pricing policies, revenues, and
income by governmental agencies. Since this institutional ele-
ment of regulation is the core of the thesis to be developed in
this paper, utility regulation is described briefly and some
terms are defined.
By and large, utilities provide essential services. By and
large, they are a heavily capitalized group of industries, as
evidenced by the high ratio of plant to revenue, ranging from
3-1 to 7-1; for ordinary industrial and commercial concerns
the ratios are well below 1-1. Most if not all utilities are indus-
tries of decreasing unit cost within wide ranges of capacity.
With certain exceptions utilities sell services rather than tan-
gible commodities; hence production for inventory to meet
peak loads is precluded. As the services rendered are deemed
necessary, utilities are normally required to serve all on de-
mand.
Competition in the utility industries is both wasteful and
ineffective in setting stable prices because the resultant dupli-
cation of relatively large amounts of plant and the consequent
inability to take advantage of decreasing unit costs have led
alternately to 'price wars' and to excessively high prices. This
violent fluctuation of utility prices, together with the general
inability to store the service, made it very difficult for enter-
prises whose cost of utilities services was a significant portion
of the total cost of production to price their products intelli-
gently and for any long period in advance. Consequently, it
was found socially desirable to fix utility rates, i.e., prices, by
governmental authority.
In time, the regulatory formula developed into what has
come to be known as the 'fair return on fair value' rule.' That
1Theargument that 'fair value' has in many cases been supplanted by 'original
cost' is trivial for our purpose, since this paper considers 'original cost' as one
possible definition of 'fair value'. Whether it should be the sole definition is
another matter.
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rule,very briefly, is this: a utility may charge such prices as
will in the aggregate return to it all reasonable operating
penses, includin.g taxes and depreciation, and in addition a
'fair return on the fair value' of its property used in rendering
the service. Thus 'fair return' is synonymous in general with
income, or the return on capital. We shall come to the mean-
ings and implications of 'fair return', and of course 'fair value',
presently.
Since gross revenues should reflect only reasonable costs of
operation, commissions have exercised supervision over oper-
ating expenses.2 Once reasonable operating costs are deter-
mined, the next step is to determine the 'fair return on fair
value'. The sum of reasonable operating costs and tbe 'fair
return' is the gross revenue the utility is entitled to earn.
Since utilities do not as a rule sell homogeneous products,
this gross revenue could be obtained by various combinations
of price or rate schedules.3 The next regulatory step is to devise
a series of rate schedules it is expected will bring in a gross
revenue equal to operating cost plus a fair return. Usually there
is no provision for an extra assessment against customers if the
rates do not bring in that revenue, or for a refund to customers
if the rates bring in more.
Commissions usually have other powers and duties, chiefly
to regulate proposed security issues, supervise the adequacy of
service, and to decide when new firms may enter the area. Regu-
latory commissions, both state and federal, control accounting
practices, spelling out in uniform systems the theory and pro-
cedures for keeping all corporate accounts.
Not all states have regulatory commissions, and not all com-
missions regulate all industries that are recognized as utilities.
Some commissions have no jurisdiction over municipally-
owned utilities, and some have no control over cooperatives.
2Usuallya utility is not prohibited from incurring whatever expenses it cares
to; however, the excess of such actual expenses over those found to be reasonable
is not reflected in determining the gross revenues to be collected from customers.
8Arate schedule is a supply price formula, quantity being the usual and often
the only independent variable.328 PARTII
But by and large, and for the more important utilities, control
is exercised throughout the country: intrastate operations are
regulated by state commissions, interstate operations by federal
commissions.4
BTHESIS
At the close of 'On the Measurement of National Wealth',
Mr. Kuznets stated that one purpose of his paper was to dis-
courage attempts at global estimates of national wealth and to
suggest studies of separate groups of wealth instruments and
claims. He continued:
"The purposes of such studies would be to establish more ade-
quately the significant classifications within the complex of wealth
instruments or claims; to explore the various difficulties that would
arise in the evaluation of the different groups, and to point a way to
measurement of national wealth that would be directed from the
beginning at the significant classifications in the field." (italics
mine)
I should like, for purposes of this paper, to adopt this quota-
tion as a text; it is peculiarly applicable to public utilities.
In attempting to explore the problems that arise in connec-
tion with evaluating public utilities, the institutional aspect
of public utility regulation must always be remembered. Prices
of public utilities are set not in the market, but by means of a
quasi-i udicial, quasi-legislative organ—the utility regulatory
commission.
The proposition I wish to explore is that this institutional
factor of regulation has established the legal-regulatory con-
cept of 'fair value' as the most significant element in determin-
ing the economic value of public utility assets.
To the extent that utility income is based on utility 'fair
value', and in accordance with the definition that wealth re-
4Thescope of state utility regulatory powers is well outlined in Moody's Public
Utility Manual, 1948, pp. a59-62. The jurisdiction of the Federal Communica.
tions Commission, the Federal Power Commission, the Interstate Commerce
Commission, the Maritime Commission, and the Civil /teronautics Board arc
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flects income-producing capacity, utility economic value is a
function of utility 'fair value'. In other words, the adoption of
a unique regulatory definition of value, i.e., 'fair value', and
the effective use of 'fair value' as a tool in determining utility
income, have created the situation where, in principle at least,
'value' tends to be identical with 'fair value'. To the extent
that actual income is different from the prescribed regulatory
income, value will differ from 'fair value'. In any event, utility
value will approach or tend to equal 'fair value', and approach
it more closely as regulation becomes more continuous and
effective.
For purposes of this paper it seems unnecessary to consider
what economic definition of fair value regulation should adopt.
That is another subject. As long as there is an effective basis
upon which income is or tends to be determined, and as long
as we identify wealth with its power to yield income, we must
accept, as a logical proposition, that this basis is just as effec-
tive in determining wealth.
The thesis I should like to explore then is essentially that
utility value is or tends to be what utility commissions and the
courts make it. I do not believe this is avoiding the problem.
The problem as I see it is: Given the institutional factors that
tend to determine utility income, what is public utility value?
The concept of public utility 'fair value' was developed after
casting about among the various economic definitions and
methods of determining value. The choice resulted from meet-
ing and failing to solve many problems of methodology. The
concepts (for there are more than one) finally adopted are a
rough compromise between the economic and administrative
elements involved; rough because into the choice went consid-
erations other than those of economics and public adminis-
tration.
However, only by giving full weight to this prime economic
factor of 'utility prices and income by regulation' can we, in
Mr. Kuznets' words, "point a way to measurement of national
wealth that would be directed...atthe significant classi-
fications in the field." (italics mine)330 PARTII
CFAIRRATE OF RETURN
Beforeplunging into the question of the valuation of public
utility assets, it is well, for several reasons, to discuss briefly the
regulatory concept of 'fair rate of return'. First, it is closely
allied to the rate at which income can, in general, be capitalized
to determine value; second, it gives useful information on how
public utility value is used in determining utility income.5 It
thus provides thelink between wealth and income for the util-
ity sector of the economy.
To set up some means of measuring 'fair return', early
thought in regulation defined 'fair return' as the product of
'fair rate of return' and 'fair value'. The classic definition of
what constitutes a 'fair rate of return' was given by Justice
Butler:
"A public utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn a
return on the value of the property which it employs for the con-
venience of the public equal to that generally being made at the
same time and in the same general part of the country on invest-
ment in other business undertakings which are attended by corre-
sponding risks and uncertainties." 6
Despitethis link between 'fair rate of return' and 'uncer-
tainty', for quite a few years the determination of 'fair rate of
return' was a matter of 'expert testimony', supported by little
else than 'experience in the field of finance' and a 'feel for the
market'. While in many instances that approach is still used,
more recently and especially since 1938, the concept of the
'cost of capital' has been developed to measure the 'fair rate
of return'.
5Weshould always know what questions we intend to answer before we begin
collecting data. In other words, the first problem is not how to go about formally
measuring wealth or value, but to decide what we intend to do with the results.
In the field of public utilities value is used to determine income.
6Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. V.PublicService Commission of
West Virginia, 262 U.S. 678, 692, 43 Sup. Ct. 675.
Justice Butler apparently considered 'risk' and 'uncertainty' synonymous, as
do many today who refer to 'business risk' as the element that gives rise to
profits. The Knightian distinction between the two will be followed in this
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Let us define 'capital structure' as the series of ratios of each
type of capital, or capital component (i.e., bonds, stocks, pre-
ferred stock, etc.), to total capital. The cost rate of total capital
may then be defined as the weighted average of the cost rates of
the capital components, the weights being the capital structure
ratios of the respective components. The cost rates of the indi-
vidual components are expressed in terms of yields on bonds
and 'adjusted' earnings-price ratios for equity, etc., the adjust-
ments being made in order to reflect cost of financing, under-
pricing, etc.
Since the cost rates of the individual types of capital are in
many cases functions of the capital structure,7 a relation be-
tween the cost rate of total capital (or cost of capital) and the
capital structure can often be established. Minimizing that
function with respect to the cost of capital, one can then deter-
mine what has been termed the 'optimum' or minimum cost
capital structure and, from this capital structure, the cost rates
of the individual capital components and the over-all cost of
capital.8
When a company's own securities are traded on the market,
some indication of the levels of the capitalization rates for the
various types of capital can be obtained directly. In addition,
or in lieu of such data, the behavior of the various capitaliza-
tion rates, both as to level and as concerns the relationship to
7Forexample, it seems evident that as the proportion of gross income required
to cover fixed interest charges increases, the uncertainty of the equity investment
wilt increase, and hence the cost rate of equity money as well.
8Acontroversy is brewing over what cost of capital really means. One school
holds that if a past or historical cost rate base is used, the contemporaneous
past cost of capital must be used in finding the fair rate of return. It is contended
further that a current cost of capital fair rate of return can be used only with
a current cost rate base.
Opponents say the above is not correct; the requirement that a past cost rate
base must go with a past cost of capital is a plea for semantic and not necessarily
economic consistency. In view of the conclusions reached later in this paper, that
capitalization of income is not a feasible method for evaluating utility assets,
the attributes of a proper capitalization rate need not concern us further here.
However, the sharp differences of opinion over what such a capitalization rate
should be indicate the difficulties inherent in the capitalization of income
approach to valuation.332 PARTH
the structure, may be determined from the market be-
havior of the securities of 'comparable' utilities.9
While this statistical approach to the cost of capital elimi-
nates in large measure reliance on unfettered expert opinion,
it must be used circumspectly and in the light of generally
sound principles of finance.
'Fair rate of return', either because of more precise analysis
or because of decreasing interest rates (probably for both rea-
sons), has fallen from typical values of 7-8 percent in the middle
1920's to 5-6 percent.
D 'FAIR VALUE' AS A MEASURE OF PUBLIC
UTILITY ASSETS
It may not be amiss at this point to emphasize a basic defini-
wealth is significant because and to the extent that it
yields income. In fact, 'things' become wealth only if they pro-
duce income. Income is not the result of wealth; the existence
or expectation of income is a prerequisite to the existence of
wealth. Consequently, the theoretically correct value must be
determined in terms of expected income flow, discounted at a
'proper' capitalization rate.'° This then leads to the conclusion
that the generally correct method of valuation is to capitalize
expected income. Yet we know of at least three other widely
used approaches to valuation, and it has been suggested that
each can in certain cases be considered an approximation to the
capitalization method; the reason for the substitution is the
practical difficulty of the direct capitalization approach."
9Thedetermination of comparability may in some cases be rather difficult, the
standards of comparability being at times a matter of subjective judgment. It is
perhaps enough to say at this point that the 'battle' of utility rate regulation has
shifted in large measure from the 'value' to the 'fair rate of return' front.
10Thisconcept is perfectly general and applicable to the economy as a whole,
but requires refinement for certain sectors; otherwise a large portion of govern-
ment-owned 'things' would be defined as free goods.
11Iventure to suggest that the practical difficulty Consists lfllargemeasure in
the fact that the capitalization rate is as complex a problem, theoretically, as
valuation, and a problem that has been lost sight of in the search for 'pure
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In general the four chief methods of valuation are: capital-
ization of income, current market price, cost of reproduction,
and original cost. We pay our respects to the forefather of the
'fair value' doctrine in public utility regulation, the case of
Smyth vs. Ames:
"And in order to ascertain that value, the original cost of construc-
tion, the amount expended in permanent the
amount and market value of its bonds and stock, the present as
compared with the original cost of construction, the probable
earning capacity of the property...areall matters for considera-
tion.... Wedo not say that there may not be other matters to
be regarded in estimating the value of the property ..." (169US
466,546).
Even without the catch-all at the end, Justice Harlan included
the four measures of value, even noting the claims approach
(to valuation). And in stating that these "are all matters for
consideration" he let utility regulation loose in an economic
labyrinth. The field of public utility valuation for regulatory
purposes has been preempted by the cost of reproduction and
original cost; at present the latter is leading.
I do not intend to discuss which of these four methods is
'best' for rate-regulatory purposes, regardless whether 'best' is
defined in legal, economic, and/or administrative terms. Nev-
ertheless, it seems desirable to consider to what extent each
method is applicable to public utilities, and how these methods
have been applied by regulatory bodies in determining 'fair
value'. Even if we were to decide on principle to accept 'fair
value' as an estimate of economic value, it is still desirable to
know, in some detail, just what 'fair value' is and is not. Such
knowledge may help to show how 'fair values' of public utili-
ties can be fitted together with values of other groups of wealth
instruments in computing over-all wealth estimates.
1Capitalization of Income
If the desideratum is to ascertain whether a given utility in-
come constitutes a 'fair return' on 'fair value', it is obviously
improper to determine the latter by capitalizing the income334 PARTII
atthe fair rate of return. Such a procedure involves circular
reasoning, and would lead to the conclusion that every income
is a fair return. For regulatory purposes therefore, capitaliza-
tion of income provides no basis for valuation. However, this
method may have use in 'discovering' value. Since it may have
a purpose, it is worth while to discuss it as a general method.
One might well approach this method by considering the
variables entering into the capitalization of income; expected
incomes, specified as to distribution in time as, well as to
amounts, and the capitalization rate.
Several difficulties of determining those variables with any
degree of accuracy are apparent. Since by the very nature of
things the incomes are expected incomes, they must be esti-
mated, i.e., they are forecasts. And since they are subjective
estimates, is it justifiable to use such an elusive basis for valua-
tion without inquiring why people think as they do, and what
correction factors should be applied to those 'thoughts'? It has
been suggested that the distribution of estimated incomes in
future time is even more elusive.
The second variable entering into this method is the capital-
ization rate. Mr. Kuznets points out that if the determination
of the future income distribution has been made in the light of
all possible risks, the capitalization rate equals the pure inter-
est rate. He qualifies this by saying that since at best such a
forecast will not reflect all 'risks' but only the more obvious
ones, a more realistic assumption is that the capitalization rate
should reflect a risk element that would vary as between differ-
ent categories of wealth. I agree in general; however, such a
forecast could at best reflect only risks, not uncertainties. The
capitalization rate must therefore, as a theoretical proposition
and not merely as a practical or 'realistic' matter, be higher
than 'pure interest', the differential varying as between catego-
ries of wealth. In fact, for many purposes these very categories
might well be defined in terms of this uncertainty differential.
As concerns expected incomes, I venture to suggest that as a
practical matter the 'future income distributions' actually used
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are very short run estimates. Moreover, they are corrected con-
tinuously in the market—by sales or decisions not to sell. The
opportunity for this type of successive correction is facilitated
by the fact that the assets themselves need not be sold—only the
claims. While theoretically, value as ascertained by capitalized
income comprehends all future income, the day to day values
as evidenced by actual sales are not capitalizations of all future
incomes—perhaps only next year's expected income. The mar-
ket simply does not have all income data; at best it has only
short run estimates of income, and they set prices.
If then only short run earnings are determinative, we need
find only short run capitalization rates. To reflect reality, the
problem can be telescoped in time from a long run, rather
vague matter, very difficult to express quantitatively, into a
short run problem which might lend itself to quantitative
analysis. Dropping the requirement of long range estimates of
the future income distribution and of a long term weighted
capitalization rate makes it considerably easier, both theoreti-
cally and practically, to utilize capitalization of income as a
valuation tool.
It has been suggested to me that capitalization of income is
not only theoretically correct but also provides a practical and
effective method of 'discovering' public utility value. The argu-
ment runs as follows: the income statements of utilities are
more reliable than their balance sheets; reported income is the
result of the application, faulty and imperfect as it may be, of
the regulatory concept of value; even though regulation is
imperfect and discontinuous, and hence reported income may
exceed what might be deemed reasonable after a full rate case,
the income was received and is a fact, and therefore becomes
the subject of valuation; one should deal with actual income,
and consider the results of regulatory valuation 'asis', not
what might be if regulation were precise and continuous, or
different from what it is; and since value depends upon in-
come, utility value should be determined by capitalizing
income.
This suggestion has merit and might be the basis for a336 PART II
pling approach to valuation. For example, assume that only
Companies a, b, c, and d of Industry A have securities out-
standing in the hands of the public and that the securities are
actively traded. Expected earnings for Companies a, b, c, and d
could be estimated and related to representative market prices
of the corresponding claims, to yield an estimate of the indus-
try-wid,e capitalization rate. This rate could then be applied to
estimated earnings of Industry A to obtain its value. However,
several qualifications are obvious. The above procedure could
apply only to sectors of the economy where the speculative
effect in setting the market price of securities is either negli-
gible or can be corrected for; and to portions of the economy
homogeneous enough to lend themselves to a sampling pro-
cedure.
While the capitalization of income approach to valuation
offers some intriguing possibilities, close scrutiny reveals diffi-
culties in both theory and practice. First, it is obvious that it
is not current or reported income that can be capitalized to
determine value, but rather future, expected income. We thus
lose the alleged factual benchmark for our capitalization. Only
if we first establish that actual income will persist can we capi-
talize it to determine value.
Second, the very suggestion of the use of the capitalization
method is founded in large measure on the practical fact that
regulation is neither continuous nor exact. Commissions esti-
mate what a given set of prices will return in the way of in-
come. If their estimate is correct, the income will be the 'fair
return' on a previously determined 'fair value' and we would
not need to capitalize income to discover this fair value. How
can it be logically proposed that a method based on an estimate
of future incomes be used to correct a situation arising from
inability to estimate future incomes? That seems to come very
close to circular reasoning.
Third, what of the capitalization rate to be used? Theoreti-
cally the capitalization rate reflects all the uncertainties in-
herent in the potential earnings situation of the enterprise.
Presumably this capitalization rate would contain elementsTANGIBLE ASSETS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES
reflecting the discontinuous character of regulation as well as
the possible error in estimating the net income effect of a pre-
scribed series of utility rates and charges. We seem to be faced
again with the task of estimating a probability distribution
with relation to future income—the very situation that gave.
rise to the suggestion of using the capitalization method of
valuation.
The determination of an 'appropriate' capitalization rate
raises problems. Obviously, an industry-wide capitalization
rate would have to be some sort of weighted average. The un-
certainty inherent in a small independent telephone company
is quite different from that in say the New York Telephone
Company. What weights would one use in computing the capi-
talization rate for the telephone industry in the United States?
Conceptually, the capitalization rate reflects the uncertainty
status of a given enterprise, and the problem of determining
that rate for any given enterprise as of a specific time is fraught
with so many difficulties, both theoretical and practical, as to
make the extension of the concept and its statistical determina-
tion a highly uncertain procedure. It is one thing to say that
an investment in the telephone business is more (or less) Un-
certai.n than an investment in the electric business; it is quite
another to set up an objective, theoretically sound and practi-
cally feasible mechanism for determining the difference. The
writer is unaware of any discussion (to say nothing of agree-
ment) on the subject and has had little opportunity to give it
much thought. Until the theoretical and practical details of an
industry-wide capitalization rate have been worked out valua-
tion by capitalizing income might well be held in abeyance on
that score alone.
In general, assume that a regulatory body sets 'fair value',
the 'fair rate of return', and prescribes a set of utility rates it is
estimated will yield the 'fair return'. Then either because of
an error in the estimate of what these utility rates would yield
in the way of net income or because demand has changed, the
actual return exceeded the fair return. Capitalizing the actual
return at the 'fair rate of return' will yield a value higher than338 PARTII
the previously determined 'fair value'. On the general basis
that 'value depends on income' it could presumably be said that
the real value is in fact higher than the 'fair value'. This seems
like ascribing value to imperfections in regulation. Perhaps
proponents of the capitalization method would argue that it
makes no difference how the income got to be larger than the
fair return; the larger the income, the larger the value.
If it could be assumed that this larger income would persist,
one could logically claim an increment in value. But that
would be assuming nonexistent or completely ineffective regu-
lation. A second, more reasonable and realistic, assumption
would be that this 'extra' income would persist for a time, say
until the next rate case. Then if it were possible to estimate
how long the larger income would persist, one could still place
a value on it. In the second case, value would fluctuate about
'fair value', and tend to approach it as regulation became more
precise and continuous. In any event 'fair value' can be viewed
as the limiting value of a tendency or long term trend. For
purposes of national wealth estimates such a figure has merit.
Thus for a comprehensive determination of wealth it would
seem that one must look to valuation methods other than the
capitalization of income.
2Current Market Price
Current market price and current reproduction cost are very
much alike in principle. Both base their claim to being indi-
cators of value on the proposition that when people buy or
assemble wealth they do so in order to obtain income.
Of course utilities are not bought and sold on the market. In
fact, even the claims to the tangible and intangible assets that
are traded represent only small fractions of the total outstand-
ing claims. In view of the infrequent (and for utilities practi-
cally nonexistent) sale of utilities as such on the market, there
is no need to more than mention the theoretical objections to
the 'current market price' approach to valuation on an asset
basis; elaborate discussions are readily found:TANGIBLE ASSETS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 339
1)Difficulty of defining 'current market price' as at a given
tinie—maiket p rices presupposing a continuous market;
2)Srnal.l volume of transactions. Here a distinction should be
made between the asset and claim approaches, primarily due
to speculative factors that find easier play in the latter case.
It was the nonexistence of a free competitive market for
utility properties that eliminated this measure of value in eval-
uating utilities for regulatory purposes. Commissions soon
found that such transactions simply did not exist. However,
the market price method has some validity in connection with
the claims approach; of that more later.
3Current Cost of Reproduction
In the early days of regulation current reproduction cost of
utilities was determined by making a detailed inventory of all
plant and property, and valuing it at prices as of a given date.
Not only was the plant priced as of that date; it was assumed to
have been built on that date—with the result that all sorts of
intangibles, hypothetical consulting fees, the tearing up of
streets that had not been torn up, etc. went into the reproduc-
tion cost of plant. Nonreproducible assets (primarily land)
were valued at estimated market prices, i.e., at current market
prices of comparable assets. For example, land was valued on
the basis of recent transactions in near-by, similarly situated
parcels. In the case of gas-producing properties, where the
'land' is not comparable except with other 'utility producing'
land, such a procedure amounts to capitalizing earnings to
determine value to determine earnings; obviously circular
reasoning. In these cases original coist was used as the next best
measure. Since utilities were being valued as going concerns, a
'going concern value' was included in the cost of reproduction.
This 'going concern value' was measured in several ways. In
some instances it was found by capitalizing the difference be-
tween the earnings in the early years of the utility's life and
what were considered 'reasonable' earnings. In other instances
it was ascertained by the theoretical cost of training an operat-340 PART II
ing force and developing a market. This 'intangible' was aban-
doned rather early. In any event, I leave this item to those who
will discuss the valuation of intangibles.
The next step in the cost of reproduction procedure was to
estimate accrued capital consumption or, as it is termed in
utility parlance, accrued depreciation. This accrued deprecia-
tion was determined by 'field inspection'. 'Experts' inspected
the property and determined its 'percent condition', the com-
plement of its accrued depreciation. They drilled test holes in
telephone poles, seriously inspected the corrosion in cast-iron
pipes, and ran a judicious eye over buildings and other plant.
For each piece of propçrty they decided its 'percent condition'.
For example, a pole deemed 10 percent depreciated was as-
signed a 90 percent condition. The weighted percent condition
was applied to the reproduction cost of the plant; to that was
added working capital and going concern value; the sum was
called 'fair value'.
While practically this method of ascertaining accrued capi-
tal consumption was subject to many peculiar interpretations,
theoretically at least it had the possibility of providing a rea-
sonable estimate.
In time this 'inventory and inspection' method of determin-
ing current cost of reproduction changed over to a procedure
of adjusting original, or book costs, by means of price indexes.12
The accuracy and acceptability of the results depended of
course on the validity of the indexes used. A rather indiscrimi-
nate use of indexes in 1933 led to an apparent rejection of this
method by the United States Supreme Court, and the method
fell into disrepute.'3 Recently it has been revived and is being
12TheICC made the most comprehensive industry-wide valuation of all rail-
roads in the country. It began as a split inventory method: roads were valued at
cost of reproduction in 1914 prices for all plant in existence in 1914, plus all
additions since 1914 at cost. The ICC has since adjusted this valuation by means
of indexes to a cost of reproduction as of January 1, 1940, and in later cases
further adjusted that. Depreciation was on both a book and inspection basis.
For rate making purposes the ICC has used a compromise value between original
and reproduction cost.
13Westv. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., 295 US 662 (1935). Actually
the Court rejected the inept use of indexes.TANGIBLE ASSETS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 341
used with much greater skill, primarily by the telephone
industry.
However, this recent use of indexes to adjust original cost
has been accompanied by a crude and theoretically erroneous
method of determining accrued capital consumption. The
ratio of current reproduction cost to original cost is applied to
the original depreciation reserve, and the product is as-
sumed to be a proper capital consumption deduction from
current reproduction cost.14 This is an inappropriate method
of deflating an original cost depreciation reserve in order to
determine a reserve applicable to the cost of reproduction.
While the original cost is multiplied by the deflating index to
get the cost of reproduction, the annual accruals must in addi-
tion be weighted by the number of years between the date of
installation and of valuation. So much for the actual proce-
dures used in the past to establish regulatory value by deter-
mining cost of reproduction.
Do the general conditions under which cost of reproduction
reflects economic value exist in the case of public utilities? It
seems clear that theoretically, cost of reproduction approaches
value only under conditions of competition and where access
to the field is open to any newcomer. In the case of public utili-
ties neither condition applies. First, instead of the classical
condition of competition, i.e., a large number of producers
each of whom considers price as given, uninfluenced by his
own actions, we have exactly the reverse situation. Secondly,
access to the field is so restricted that competition is practically
nonexistent. In the few instances where it does exist, regula-
tion tends to eliminate Hence, expected marginal returns
determine whether an existing plant shall be 'reproduced',
i.e., replaced. An existing utility will not install a new, lower
This is the reverse of the equally erroneous procedure applied by the ICC in
1938 in Ex. Parte No. 115, where the ratio of cost of reproduction minus clepre-
ciation to cost of reproduction new was applied to original cost to reflect accrued
depreciation on an original cost basis.
The merger of Western Union and Postal Telegraph in the national telegraph
field, and the combination of the Keystone and Bell Telephone Companies in
Philadelphia are two recent examples.342 PARTII
'costof production' plant unless the total return on the new
plant exceeds the annual costs of the new plant plus the amor-
tization of the old plant.'6
Mr. Kuznets points out also a condition under which cost of
reproduction has an upward bias: when additions to assets can
be made more readily than withdrawals, especially if total de-
mand remains constant. This situation is specially true of pub-
lic utilities. Utility assets are, on the whole, long-lived; hence
depreciation charges, usually the sole means of withdrawing
utility capital, are a very slow means of such withdrawal. In
most instances, increases in utility plant must be substantial.'7
Also in view of the regulatory requirement of serving all upon
demand, additions must be made promptly. On the other hand,
withdrawals of any substantial amounts of utility plant are
permitted rather rarely.18 The conditions for an upward bias
when the cost of reproduction is used as a measure of value
seem specially present in the utility sector of the economy.10
Another theoretical difficulty with the use of current cost of
reproduction as an estimate of value arises in connection with
the determination and measurement of accrued capital con-
sumption, discussed briefly in Section 5.
16 In view of regulation,. the problem arises whether in the interest of stimulat-
ing the use of the most economical plant the utility should be allowed to include
such amortization in operating expense or whether the advent of a more eco-
nomical plant constitutes the maturation of an uncertainty, and as such has
been for, in a past rate of return in excess of pure interest.
17 This is not true for all types of assets for all utilities; e.g., a bus company can
add one bus, a railroad one locomotive. On the other hand, because of the rela-
tive economy of large units, the addition of a generator by an electric utility
may mean an investment of $5,000,000.
18 Witness Western Union's difficulty in obtaining permission to curtail service
in certain communities.
19 With at least three possible qualifications: Total demand is not constant for
all utilities; while some are growing, some are static, others even declining.
Moreover, some industries such as bus and air transport, and to a degree rail
transportation, can contract capital readily because certain separable units are
short-lived. The third possible qualification hinges on the definition of capital
consumption. If a decrease in demand and certain regulatory requirements can
be deemed to lead to consumption of capital, the upward bias may be minimized.TANGIBLE ASSETS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 343
4Original Cost
Historically, and because the other two methods were inappli-
cable, reproduction and original cost soon preempted public
utility regulatory valuation.
Since the advent of accounting control by regulatory com-
missions and the adherence to uniform systems of accounting
(uniform at least for a given industry), original cost has taken
on a specificity in principle that was entirely lacking in the
cost of reproduction approach.. As long as these systems of ac-
counting are used, original cost is not only uniquely defined
but has the administrative advantage of being readily ascer-
tainable for a large proportion of utilities. For utility regula-
tory purposes it has the advantage of being a fact and not sub-
ject to adustments based on opinion. Also, it avoids the time-
consuming element of elaborate inventories. These advan-
tages have made original cost attractive for regulatory purposes.
Theoretically, original cost has little to recommend it. It
reflects past decisions, which for the normal run of economic
activity are so much water over the dam. Moreover, since the
original cost of assets as of a given time is the sum of the actual
dollar cost of each, identical items can have different original
costs. However, if it is desired to adjust original cost so as to
obtain values for given years at current year prices, or to obtain
a series of values at a given year's prices, original cost is a good
starting point for adjustments by means of a deflating tech-
nique, using appropriate indexes.
As concerns utilities, capital consumption in connection
with original or book cost is reflected in what is called a 'depre-
ciation reserve'. To this reserve is credited an amount equal to
the 'annual depreciation expense', presumably an estimate of
annual capital consumption. Retirements are debited to this
reserve, and corresponding credits are entered in the appro-
priate asset account, also at original cost. The depreciation
reserve hence purports to be a measure of accrued capital con-
sumption, not a reserve for replacements. This reserve can be
çleflated to reflect the effect of price changes; hence it can be344 PART H
restated for a series of years at current prices, or at constant
prices of any given year. Whether such adjustments yield a
good estimate of capital consumption will be discussed pres-
ently.
Whatever its specific virtues, if any, original cost is often the
sole basis upon which accounting data pertinent to valuation
are available for most utility industries. It is also the basis upon
which many business judgments are made.
But most significant from the viewpoint of finding utility
wealth, original or book cost is the most important single fac-
tor upon which the majority of regulatory commissions deter-
mine regulatory value. A good many commissions treat, in
principle and/or practice, original or book cost synonymously
with regulatory value.
The writer is aware of many criticisms leveled at original
cost not only as an appropriate regulatory measure of 'fair
value' but also as a proper basis for estimating economic value
for purposes of national wealth estimates. The objections in
the former group may or may not be well taken; in any event
they are outside the scope of this paper. A criticism falling
in the latter category is worth discussing briefly. It has been
said that a utility with an allowable income of say $600,000
per year is obviously worth more than one with an income of
$500,000, even though they may have the same original cost,
and a method that indicates equal values is faulty. l3ut why
would these two utilities have different allowable incomes?
Presumably the uncertainty attached to each is different; and
hence the capitalization rate would be different. Thus even
the implied remedy, capitalization of income, might well show
the same value for different incomes. If we assume identical
companies, why should the allowable income be different? The
hidden assumption in this objection is that the capitalization
rate is the same, and as such begs the entire question.
5Measurement of Capital Consumption
Our primary concern here is less with current or annual capital
consumption than with establishing the accrued or total capi-TANGIBLE ASSETS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 345
tal consumption that exists in the assets to be valued. The flow
of capital consumption and the sum total of that flow as be-
tween two dates are, however, intimately related.
To narrow the discussion to the subject at hand, i.e., public
utilities, and to consider the general aspects of the problem, a
little background in the depreciation accounting procedure
of utilities may be of interest. In the earlier days of utility
accounting for capital consumption the basic approach was
'retirement accounting'. A retirement reserve was built up by
charges to operating expense to' a level thought sufficient to
take care of (accounting-wise) the retirement of the largest
volume of plant that would be retired at one time. Neither the
reserve nor the charges were related, in theory or practice, to
depreciation. The charges were arbitrary and solely within
the discretion of management, the amount often being dic-
tated by business conditions. When business was good, the
charges were high; when business was poor, they were reduced
or omitted.
The telephone industry was a notable exception. Quite early
it adopted depreciation accounting on the straight line basis.
The general trend to depreciation accounting, especially to a
straight line basis, has been strong. Depreciation accounting
presupposes annual charges, which presumably approximate
the annual accrual of depreciation, to operating expense. This
annual accrual may be on a straight line, an interest, a unit of
output, or various other bases. The annual charges are credited
to the depreciation reserve (a balance sheet account). Retire-
ments constitute debits to the reserve.
As the scope and thoroughness of regulation increased, both
the depreciation expense and the reserve became the subject
of careful scrutiny. In time the reserve began to take on the
character of a measure of the accrued depreciation or accrued
capital consumption that was to be deducted from original
cost to determine the net cost of plant. This change in the inter-
pretation of the reserve was strongly objected to by certain
utilities which claimed that a reserve equal say to 30 percent of
book plant was consistent with a claim that the plant was in 95346 PART II
percent condition, i.e., only 5 percent depreciated, because,
through maintenance, the plant was kept in nearly perfect
operating condition.
The gap between the reserve and accrued depreciation be-
gan to narrow about 1935. Today both commissions and
utilities generally accept the depreciation reserve as a proper
deduction from original cost in determining net original cost.
While it is not the purpose here to consider the various for-
mulas used by different utilities to determine depreciation
expense and reserve, it may be well to recognize that most com-
missions now prescribe straight line depreciation, and a large
proportion of utilities now keep their books on this basis.
Table 1 shows the trend in this direction for the electric utility
industry and also indicates the methods used. The Bell System
Companies, which in the aggregate provide over 80 percent of
the telephone service in the United States, have used straight
line depreciation for many years. Other utility industries are
in the process of changing over, and as a result, industry data
reflect a combination of methods, making analysis difficult.
In any consideration of capital consumption, one must al-
ways keep in mind that it can be defined in various ways, de-
pending upon the purpose of the estimates. Without going into
all the ramifications, several variations are pertinent here.2°
A concept useful for ascertaining net income for an account-
ing period is not directly applicable for establishing the total
change in capital over time or for measuring the total accu-
mulated capital consumption to be deducted from the gross
current cost of capital assets.
For example, the complete consumption of an automobile
tire is a consumption of capital. However, if a tire is used up
in less than the usual accounting period, one year, its cost may
never appear in any capital account, but merely be handled
via the operating expense, 'maintenance'. If it is desired to
reflect in estimates of capital consumption such items as the
consumption of a tire, we must obviously recast the usual busi-
20Foran admirable discussion see Capital Consumption and Adjustment by






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































nessaccounting procedures, shifting substantial sums from
'maintenance and repairs' expense accounts to depreciation
expenses. For purposes of ascertaining income it makes no
difference whether the cost of the tire is charged to mainte-
nance or to depreciation expense; in either event it is a deduc-
tion from gross revenue. But for purposes of fixing value it
does make a difference whether one considers the tire as a
fixed asset or not.
To avoid duplication and undue accounting refinement,
regulatory commissions define the major items of plant as
'units of property'.2' The retirement of a 'unit of property'
results in a credit to the plant account and a charge to the
depreciation reserve. The replacement of a minor item, i.e.,
not a 'unit of property', is charged to operating expense and
does not lead to any entries in either the fixed asset or deprecia-
tion reserve accounts. This is a pragmatic approach to account-
ing, the effect of which on estimates of capital consumption
depends upon how major or significant are the 'units of prop-
erty'.
The extent of maintenance has of course a profound effect
upon the accruing depreciation of plant. However, if the esti-
mates of future economic life, and hence the annual charges
to depreciation expense and credits to depreciation reserve,
are made in the light of an expected 'normal' maintenance,
there seems to be no need to add depreciation and maintenance
expense to obtain an estimate of annual capital consumption.
Only when maintenance and repairs expense gets out of bal-
ance with the annual depreciation expense, especially if the
depreciation expense is on an average basis (such as straight
line depreciation), will there be either an under- or an over-
statement of capital consumption. It is in recognition of this
situation that depreciation is defined, for utility regulatory
21Ingeneral a unit of property is one whose economic life exceeds one year, the
conventional accounting period. To avoid burdensome accounting detail 'minor'
items, i.e., minor in terms of their cost, are not classified as units of property.
For example, a valve whose life may be several years would nevertheiess not be
considered a unit of property because of its low cost as compared with that of
the over-all boiler assembly.TANGIBLE ASSETS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 349
purposes, as the consumption of capital not restored by current
maintenance.22
The above should not be construed as suggesting that depre-
ciation reserves on the books of all utilities can be presumed to
be measures of accrued depreciation. Too many suffer from
former sins of omission. However, as these reserves approach
the standards set up by current uniform systems of accounting,
they will not only reflect better estimates of accrued capital
consumption for regulatory purposes, and hence for estimating
value,23 but also make available better estimates of capital con-
sumption than are ordinarily available for any sector of the
economy.
22TheNew York Public Service Commission's definition of depreciation is
typical:
"Depreciation, as applied to electric plant, means the net loss in service value
not restored by current maintenance, incurred in connection with the consump-
tion or prospective retirement of electric plant in the course of service from
causes which are known to be in current operation and against which the utility
is not protected by insurance. Among the causes to be given consideration are
wear and tear, decay, action of the elements, inadequacy, obsolescence, changes
in the art, changes in demand and requirements of public authorities."
I disagree in principle with certain parts of this definition, since it implies
that the listed causes can be considered in fixing the annual depreciation ex-
pense. I agree, however, that on a post hoc basis, capital consumption may have
resulted from each or any of those causes. By implication the definition neglects
to distinguish between capital consumption on capital account and on in-
come account. See my article, 'Uncertainty and the Provision for Depreciation
in the Public Utility Industries', Journal of Business, University of Chicago,
Oct. 1943, p. 209.
23Atthis point I must reiterate a basic premise: utility value tends to be what
commissions make it.
I am aware of the argument that this premise may lead to the conclusion that
two plants, one owned by a private company and used to produce electricity for
its own use, and another a public utility, otherwise identical, would have differ-
ent values, both gross and net. This is not only possible but logical. Physically
the plants are i'dentical; economically they are not. They are no more identical
economically than a plant operating under monopoly conditions and the iden-
tical physical plant operating in a competitive situation; though the costs may
be the same, the prices and incomes need not.
In fact I may go further—my premise would lead me to the conclusion that
identical plants, subject to different commissions which adopt different deprecia.
tiori rates, would have identical gross values but different net values. This too
seems perfectly logical, and the inevitable result of the previously discussed
institutional factor.350 PART II
One qualification on this optimistic statement: A substantial
number of utilities have turned to depreciation accounting
relatively recently. Not all have adjusted their depreciation
reserves to make up for past deficiencies. But the trend is
toward restating such reserves so that they will eventually
represent 'reserve requirements'. Until such time, the re-
ported reserves must be used with caution, and are subject to
these shortcomings. And while the theory of these adjust-
ments is straightforward enough, the practice is a job far be-
yond the scope of this paper. despite the tendency
of commissions to use original cost minus depreciation re-
serve as utility value for earnings and rate control, in a sub-
stantial area of utility regulation current cost of reproduction
minus depreciation is used, or at least considered, in deter-
mining utility value.
Given a book or original cost depreciation reserve, and
assuming it to be adequate for original cost valuation pur-
poses, how should it be adjusted so that it may be used with
an original cost adjusted to reflect cost at a given year's prices?
Were the price level the sole variable to adjust for, the tech-
nique would not be difficult. Mr. Fabricant has already
described and applied it in Capital Consumption and Adjust-
ment.24 The difficulty in applying this technique is statistical
—it is hard to obtain enough representative data to develop
the necessary indexes. One must design construction cost
and other indexes—a problem that would be simplified by
confining the method to utilities as a group, and possibly fur-
ther, to individual industries within the group.25 Since more
24 See especially Chapter 10, Price Changes and Measures of Capital Consump-
tion.
25 It is undoubtedly simpler and much more accurate to devise an index for
construction costs in the telephone industry than for all utilities, and that in
turn better than an index for all business. By bringing the analysis down to that
lower level a weighted average index of construction could be obtained, the
weights reflecting the proportion of plant represented by each index, before
weighting the weighted average index of construction by the estimated deprecia-
tion charge applicable to the plant constructed at the given prices. Also under
these conditions the estimates of depreciation charge could be very much more
precise. See Capital and Adjustment, p. 165.TANGIBLE ASSETS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 351
comprehensive data are available for utilities, the task of
adjusting original. cost depreciation reserves to either current
or a given year's prices is simplified. But, as Mr. Fabricant
carefully points out, this elimination of the 'hetero-tem-
porality' of original cost reserves does not correct for a change
in kind or quality of the equipment. In other words, obsoles-
cence due to advances in the arts and changes in demand (to
mention two of the more important elements) cannot be cor-
rected for statistically. Advances in the arts, probably the
more important for most utilities, tend to make existing
equipment relatively obsolete. Consequently, for utilities that
typically have long-lived equipment and are subject to an
improving technique, even the price level adjusted reserve be-
comes a poor measure of accrued capital consumption. It seems,
at least tentatively, that a statistical approach to reproduction
cost depreciation founders on the rock of obsolescence, as did
the 'field inspection' approach.2° Perhaps the problem could
be solved by a combination of the two.
6Value of Utilities that Cannot Earn a Fair Return
For the most part, the market for utility services is a growing
one, and the character of demand such that except during
severe depressions a 'fair return' can be earned at various price
schedules. Relatively high prices will ordinarily restrict con-
sumption, yet a 'fair return' can be earned for the correspond-
ing low level of consumption. Lower prices will for certain
sectors of the market lead to larger consumption; and a fair
return can be earned at this higher level of use.27
However, at times because of what may be termed industrial
20Thelatter suffered not from any theoretical disability but from the failure to
usethecost of reproducing the most economical plant to provide the service as
a basis for measuring the obsolescence in the theoretically reproduced actual
plant.
27 Utilities do not sell a homogeneous product. A kw. hr. of electric energy con-
sumed in lighting households is an entirely different economic good than a
physically identical kw. hr. consumed in factory lighting. Utility services are
therefore sold not on a single price schedule, but on a series of schedules, each
listing the unit price for successive blocks of consumption. Differential pricing is
quite well advanced in certain utility industries.
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obsolescence the market for a given type of service so degen-
erates that at no schedule of prices can the utilitythe indus-
try earn what may be deemed a fair rate of return.28 In other
words, the 'fair rate of return', when applied to regulatory
'fair value', results in an indicated 'fair return' that cannot
be earned by the utility at any conceivable series of rate sched-
ules.29 When faced with this problem, commissions set prices
on essentially a monopoly-pricing basis—the maximization of
profits. Does this situation require that we revise our concept
of 'fair return' as well as of 'fair value', the more significant
concept for our present purpose?
It might well be argued that if earnings are the key to value,
and if a certain property cannot earn, or its earning power is
impaired because of waning demand, jts value has been corre-
spondingly impaired. The property has to all intents and pur-
poses depreciated; its plant has become at least partly obsolete
because it is no longer in line with the demand for its services.
The commonly accepted definitions of depreciation include
changes in demand as a cause. It would therefore seem that
the depreciation reserve should reflect this obsolescence. How-
ever, the fact that the utility cannot earn a fair return on net
value (i.e., after the deduction of this reserve) proves that the
reserve does not reflect obsolescence.8° The problem is how to
measure the effect of the 'matured uncertainty'. A possible
answer would be to capitalize the maximized income at the
fair rate of return.3'
28 The railroads seemed to be in that general situation prior to the war. The
currently recurring applications for rate increases may be an indication that the
disease is chronic. The telegraph industry too may be in this state.
20 This is true despite the 'essentiality' of utility services, and because at certain
prices substitute services would be utilized.
30 It is theoretically impossible that the reserve could 'cover' such obsolescence.
A long-term decline in demand seems to be a well-nigh perfect example of busi-
ness (in the Knightian sense). In fact, it seems to be the prime
business uncertainty. See my 'Uncertainty and the Provision for Depreciation in
the Public Utility Industries'.
This does not involve circular reasoning, for here we are not determining the
value upon which to base earnings. By definition the situation rules out this
procedure; here earnings have been determined by factors other than regulation;
we seek to discover the value implied by these earnings.TANGIBLE ASSETS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 353
How does the cost of capital behave in such a situation? As
the demand for the particular utility service declines below
the economic capacity of the plant, and as a further decline is
expected, the investment desirability of the securities of the
utility (or utility industry if the decline is industry-wide)
diminishes. Not only will the market price drop but the yield
on the bonds and the earnings-price ratio of the stock will tend
to go up, since present earnings will be discounted as indica-
tions of future earnings.32 The determination of a capital-
ization rate under these circumstances would be even more
difficult than usual. However, theoretically and subject to this
difficulty, there seem to be no serious objections to determin-
ing utility value by capitalizing earnings.
To the extent that original cost minus depreciation is used
for general value determinations of such utilities, that cost
clearly overstates utility value. The overstatement is inflated
by the fact that when demand is declining, as a long-term mat-
ter, firms skimp on maintenance and, to give a semblance of
financial wellbeing, tend to understate depreciation charges
(where and to the degree they are within the discretion of the
company). The depreciation reserve becomes an ever poorer
estimate of accrued capital consumption, as does the income
statement for purposes of ascertaining net income on any
realistic basis.
7The Claims Approach to Valuation
Securities have value for the same reason that tangible assets
have value—each is a 'source' of income. To the extent that
both the tangible assets and the claims against them are valued
for essentially the same income, the value of the latter may
serve as a check on that of the former. However, claims and
tangible assets can rarely be matched exactly. In addition to
such assets as plant, cash, and receivables, there are always such
intangibles as 'goodwill' or 'going concern value'.
32Underthese circumstances the usual measures of cost of capital will tend to
overstate the true capitalization rate and hence understate the value as measured
by capitalized earnings.354 PARTII
And this is essentially the basic difficulty with using the
claims-value approach as an independent check on the value of
tangible assets. Does the value of claims reflect only the value
of tangible assets or of tangible assets plus intangibles such as
monopoly status and value of managerial skill? These are
sources of income and hence constitute wealth. The question
is, then, does such wealth attach to the tangible assets or is it
a separable and separate item of wealth? If we assert that we
have two distinct classes of wealth, we must conclude that a
given electric motor has one value when operated by a skillful
mechanic but a lower value when operated by a clumsy one.
This proves nothing, for we can come to an apparently even
more paradoxical conclusion: that a given combination of
operator and motor is more valuable, i.e., constitutes more
wealth, when operated to make a marketable product than
when operated to make a product that cannot be sold; we have
income in the first case and none in the second. We can of
course define the difference in earning capacity as 'going con-
cern value' or 'goodwill'.
This type of analysis by definition quickly leads into meta-
physics. The crux of the matter is that in valuing claims we
value the entire enterprise as a going concern. An attempt to
value any segment of the total assets by th.e claims approach
involves one in an impossible allocation—between tangible and
intangible assets.
The claims approach in general proceeds on the theory that
wealth is a capitalization of expected income and, as in the case
of tangible assets, we must take the indirect approach. Obvi-
ously the reproduction cost of claims is identical with market
price. The field here narrows to book cost and current market
price. However, using the book cost of claims as an independ-
ent check on public utility value as determined for the most
part by the original, or book cost of plant leads to an identity.
Assets equal liabilities as a bookkeeping procedure—the books
balance. The earned surplus accounts (within the limits of
corporate solvency) expand and contract to keep the books in
balance. And since earned surplus is a part of common stockTANGIBLE ASSETS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 355
equity, the book value of claims is bound to equal the net book
value of the assets.
What about the current market price of claims? Are market
prices of traded claims an acceptable basis for valuing them?
We may ignore to a large extent the speculative factor, since
it is at a minimum in the case of public utility securities. By
and large they are traded on an earnings basis; the very fact of
regulation would tend to bring this about. But what prices
are we to use?
Stock market prices fluctuate daily. It is doubtful that in-
come expectations fluctuate as rapidly. And the capitalization
rate is conceptually a stable factor, which has significance only
as a trend, not as a 'spot' figure. One could not use a 'spot' earn-
ings-price ratio as a measure of the capitalization rate for com-
mon stock. 'Spot' market prices are equally meaningless as a
measure of value.
However, if we are to 'normalize', or average market prices
of securities, we meet the difficulty we had with current market
prices of tangible property—how to define 'current'. A repre-
sentative period for averaging utility common stock may range
from 3 to 7 years or more. As in the case of tangible assets, cur-
rent prices are not on 'as of a given, date' data; they are, as
Mr. Kuznets says, "an aspect of flow". In addition, the claims
approach would leave 'some serious gaps in the data, since a
surprising number of utilities do not have securities on the
market; th.e securities are owned by holding companies or
other affiliates. Utilities owned by governmental agencies and
cooperatives would be excluded also.
In the case of combination companies, the market prices of
the securities reflect a complex aggregate of evaluations of the
various components. The problem of allocation becomes espe-
cially difficult; the statistical procedure of a partial regression
analysis to analyze the combination even for a single utility
industry is a major undertaking, and when completed, is sub-
ject to serious doubt on theoretical economic grounds.
Overhanging the whole claims approach is the matter of
consolidating outstanding claims to avoid duplication. In the356 PARTII
utility industries there is extensive inter-company security
holding. There would be numerous duplications in a simple
arithmetic total of all the securities of a given utility industry.
To eliminate them, especially on a market price basis, would
be a prodigious task. However, to the extent that such an arith-
metic sum does not conceal details of capital structure, it is of
some significance.
Of course the use of cost of capital as a measure of rate of
return precludes the use of the market price of certain securi-
ties as a means of setting regulatory utility value. But under
continuous and effective regulation, with a rate of return re-
flecting security market realities, the market price of claims
would approach regulatory value.33 Therefore to use the mar-
ket price of claims to indicate utility value is theoretically pos-
sible. To the degree that regulation is neither continuous nor
effective, the market price of claims may not only reflect utility
value in the long run but also a capitalization of windfall
earnings due to the lag in or lack of regulation. This, in con-
junction with the practical difficulties outlined, makes this
approach to utility value very unsatisfactory. The book cost of
claims is even less satisfactory. We seem to be left with the sub-
stantive approach to the valuation of public utility tangible
assets.
F ALLOCATION
Allocation has three general aspects:
Separating utility operations from multipurpose operations.
One instance is that exemplified by the Tennessee Valley Au-
thority, where the electric utility operations are carried on
jointly with those of flood control, navigation, soil conserva-
tion, etc.
Separating the various types of utility from combination utility
operations. Typical of this situation are the combination elec-
tric and gas companies, and the electric and steam companies.
83 If the fair rate of return or the actually earned rate of return were higher or
lower than the ordinary interest rate, adjusted for uncertainty, the markets
capitalization would differ from regulatory value.TANGIBLE ASSETS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 357
Allocating the value of claims among the various types of assets
underlying them.
The first aspect is of special importance in view of the basic
premise that wealth determination should proceed on the basis
of significant classifications of the economy. In addition to the
multipurpose government projects many private industrial
concerns own and operate very large power plants primarily to
supply energy for their own industrial operations but sell, as
utilities, substantial amounts of power. About 18 percent of
the country's total electric energy production capacity is owned
and operated by such industrial concerns. While the energy
they sell as utilities and their revenue therefrom could be cal-
culated, any allocation of their total power production facilities
to such utility operation would be confronted with all the
theoretical and practical difficulties of cost analysis. The prob-
lem is academic for present purposes since such operations are
not formally classified as public utilities. In principle we have
a case of both joint and overhead costs.
Any analysis on a byproduct assumption, while possibly
valid for certain pricing purposes, is obviously not valid for
purposes of wealth estimates. In the case of government-owned
multipurpose projects, where the kind and volume of plant is
what it is because it was built in expectation and partly for the
purpose of providing power, a byproduct analysis is of even
less value. Here we have the additional complicating factor
that one or more of the joint products are not sold on any
market, and those that are sold are often priced on a basis
somewhat different from the basis on which the same products
are sold by nongovernmental units. Hence a capitalization of
income approach is of little if any use.34 Here too the problem
is one of allocating costs among joint products. It is a very
important problem, an acceptable solution of which is yet to
be found. My guess is that the answer lies in a careful econ-
ometric analysis of cost functions.
a4Itis not proposed to discuss here either what is a capitalization rate for govern-
ment operation of utility plant or the ramifications of the effect of the payment
(or nonpayment) of taxes or other expenses.358
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Asimilar problem of allocation arises in the case of natural
gas companies. In many instances the production, or better,
extraction of natural gas is a joint operation with petroleum
extraction. The problem of allocation here is just as involved
as in the case of multipurpose hydro-installations. In any event,
for present purposes this problem too is academic since the
extraction of natural gas is formally classified with mining, not
with public utilities.
The second phase of the problem, to segregate the various
types of utility from combination utilities, raises all the pre-
ceding questions as well as certain problems of a different
character. If we are concerned with utilities as a group, this
allocation is unnecessary. If some classification is desired, it can
be based on the major operation of the combination utility,
'majority' being defined possibly in terms of gross revenue.
Another difficulty arises, again from the institutional factor
of regulation. Even a casual analysis will often show that while,
for example, the electric portion of a business is doing well, the
gas operations are not. Strictly applied, utility regulation
would set electric rates at a level to support the value of the
electric investment. However, no schedule of rates can, in many
cases, earn a fair return on the gas portion of the investment,
and theoretically the gas rates would have to be so low as to
earn less than a fair return. If they were, the total return to the
utility would be less than a fair return on the total value. In
many instances, however, such a situation is resolved by raising
the electric rates to a level higher than necessary for the electric
operation alone, so as to bring a total return adequate to sup-
port the total investment. In such cases the total value is re-
flected in the depreciated original cost of the total plant
(assuming an original cost approach). Under these conditions,
any allocation on the basis of original cost of each type of plant
is logically incorrect. It will overstate the gas plant by exactly
the same amount as would occur if the gas plant were separate
and still unable to earn a fair return. However, in view of the
regulatory action, the total value of the two would be correct.
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takes of the nature of the first two. If one is concerned with
transactor groups, the allocation of claims to nonutility opera-
tions is significant. If a narrower definition is desired, i.e.,
steam utility as opposed to electric utility, etc., more extensive
allocations will have to be made. In theory, the allocation
should proceed on an income basis. However, the segregation
of income itself entails an allocation of expenses and plant. On
net balance such a procedure is, or comes dangerously close to,
circular reasoning.
In view of the conclusion that the claims approach is not a
very useful tool for valuing public utility assets, this complex
subject is not discussed further. In any event, the general prob-
1cm of overhead costs, joint production, and allocation is com-
plicated, and the writer knows of no adequate general solution.
F VALUE COMPARISONS
One purpose of wealth estimates is to compare wealth at dif-
ferent times, either for the economy as a whole or for selected
sectors. Before going into this question it is pertinent to in-
quire whether public utility value measured according to the
concept adopted in this paper can be added to the value of
other sectors of the economy, however measured, to yield an
aggregate as of a given time. I think the answer is 'yes'. In this
connection Mr. Kuznets' comments are apropos:
"The demands of the economic analyses in which estimates of
groups of wealth instruments are to be used should dictate the
answer to the question not only of scope but also of valuation. For
some problems the gross value of such instruments, at either origi-
nal or reproduction cost, is more significant than the gross value
adjusted for accumulated consumption. For other problems either
original cost or reproduction cost is the valid method. For still
others the current market price may be the only admissible basis
of valuation. No general statement can be made except the need of
considering the various problems in which the estimates are to be
used in deciding the questions of valuation. And it is quite possible
that such consideration will call for application of different meth-
ods of valution to different groups of wealth instruments, as the360 PARTII
only condition of the comparability of the latter and of their addi-
bility into a significant total." (my italics)
It is the validity of the method of valuation for the particular
group of wealth instruments, not necessarily the 'sameness' of
the method for all groups, that is essential. In view of the cur-
rent state of utility regulation, original or book cost not only
is the most important single direct element considered by com-
missions in determining regulatory value, but also serves as
the base for adjustments when elements other than original
cost are considered. As such, original cost is probably as sig-
nificant an estimate of utility value as can be obtained. If this
regulatory value is accepted as the appropriate measure of
utility value, it can properly be added to and compared with
the value of other wealth instruments, however measured.
The objections to this 'split-inventory' approach are com-
parable with those leveled at a similar cost approach suggested
by Means, Currie, and Nathan in their discussion of income
from government activity.30 There the chief objection to the
cost approach also seems to be that data obtained on a cost
basis would be inconsistent with those obtained for other sec-
tors of the economy; and despite the difference in the nature of
governmental activity, the market place approach should
nevertheless rule for government-owned assets in order not to
distort the over-all picture. But there is this significant dif-
ference between governmental activity and regulated utility
operations: for government 'output' a market evaluation
would have to be imputed; for utility output a market price is
available. The latter, however, is set by regulatory action stem-
ming from the regulatory value of utility assets, not by the free
interplay of the market. Because of this institutional situation
regulatory value is best adapted for estimating utility value;
the latter can therefore be combined with the value of other
groups of assets in determining total wealth. The apparent
lack of comparability of valuation methods as among groups
35Studiesin Income and Wealth, Volume Two, pp. 55-6.
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of assets does not introduce any limitations not basically en-
gendered by society's decision that utility rates be set by regula-
tion.
For purposes of comparing wealth over time, the Conference
on Research in Income and Wealth chose 1929, 1939, and 1946.
Had regulatory policy since 1929 been substantially what it is
today, and had utility accounting since 1929 been at the level
it is today, it would be appropriate to compare original or book
cost minus depreciation as of each date. But utility accounting
has improved greatly since the 1920's, and utility regulatory
policy has certainly changed. Until the early 1930's, or at least
1929, cost of reproduction (computed by repricing inventories)
minus depreciation (estimated by inspection of physical assets)
was the preponderant and ruling approach to regulatory value.
By 1939 the situation was part way between that in 1929 and
the present. Correcting for changes in accounting principles
and practices would be only slightly less difficult than adjusting
for shifts in regulatory policy. In either event any attempt in
that direction would have to get down almost to individual
companies. The volume of detail would be tremendous.
One point more: in the controversy over the relative effi-
ciency of wealth and income estimates for purposes of economic
analysis, may I put in a plea for income, if both would serve
equally well? Income is more precisely defined and much more
susceptible to adjustment for various purposes, especially com-
parisons over time.
When the question of the relation between income and
wealth arises, it is my tentative suggestion that for utilities the
claims approach will prove more efficient. The relation will
then be defined in terms of weighted yields on market prices
of securities.
G SUMMARY
The value of public utility assets approaches and tends to equal
their rate-making or regulatory value. As regulation becomes
more continuous and effective, the gap between the two tends
to narrow. In the absence of a universally accepted standard for362 PARTH
fixing regulatory value, and since actual income may differ
from estimated 'fair return', it is impossible to ascertain specific
industry-wide value; the best that can be hoped• for is to define
this value within certain limits. Since regulation sets utility
value between cost of reproduction at current prices and orig-
inal cost, or at either, these established the range. In view of
the general use of uniform systems of accounting prescribing
utility accounting for fixed assets on an original cost basis, such
cost is not only one measure of utility value but also the datum
from which the cost of reproduction at any price level can be
calculated statistically.
To determine accrued capital consumption is much more
difficult. In general, original or book depreciation reserves are
an adequate basis for estimating accrued capital consumption.
For utilities that have used depreciation accounting for a short
time, or have not adjusted reserves to reflect what has been
termed 'reserve requirements', adjustment is obviously neces-
sary. It can best proceed on a company basis.
A much more difficult problem, theoretically as well as prac-
tically, is presented when an original cost or book depreciation
reserve is to be adjusted to reflect accrued capital consumption
on a cost of reproduction basis. Appropriate though the in-
dexes to correct such a reserve for changes in price level may
be, obsolescence, owing primarily to advances in the arts,
makes for a wide margin of error. Since obsolescence due to
the incidence of an uncertainty is, strictly speaking, capital
consumption on capital account rather than on income ac-
count, the problem is not as serious in ascertaining utility
income as it is in estimating net value. Therefore a deprecia-
tion reserve built up by credits of annual depreciation expense
tends to understate accrued capital consumption, even on an
original cost basis. The effect of adjusting such a reserve to a
current cost basis compounds the error, in the light
of an ever improving utility technology.
The claims approach resolves into a choice between book
and market price values. The former is not an independent
check on the direct evaluation of assets, and therefore addsTANGIBLE ASSETS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 363
nothing. The market price of claims may reflect much more
than the value of the underlying tangible assets, and that ap-
proach therefore yields ambiguous results. Windfall earnings
arising from the lag in or ineffectiveness of utility regulation
may act to create temporary values, which would be reflected
in the market price of the associated claims. However, it is
doubtful that the capitalization of such elements gives rise to
values permanent enough to be included in estimates of na-
tional wealth.
The situation is somewhat different in the case of public
utilities that, because of a 'permanently' depressed demand,
cannot earn what would be called a fair return by the usual
regulatory standards. In such instances it is suggested that the
capitalization of maximized monopoly income affords, theo-
retically at least, a reasonable estimate of utility value. As a
practical problem estimating such a value is not only fraught
with all the difficulties of ascertaining an adequate capitaliza-
tion rate but also poses the statistical problem of finding out
which utilities are in the category.
In addition there is allocation, a problem not unique to
public utilities, of course. In the case of utilities it has three
aspects: the separation of two types of utility in the case of
combination companies, the separation of utility from non-
utility operation, and the allocation of the value of claims. For
purposes of dividing the economy into meaningful sectors,
some form of allocation is necessary, but poses serious theo-
retical difficulties. To estimate aggregate value, the theoretical
difficulties are less serious, since the purpose is primarily to
eliminate duplication and bridge gaps in the data.
If public utility value tends to approach regulatory value,
what frame of reference have we for organizations that sell
utility services to the public but are not subject to regulation?
In this group are utilities operated by governmental bodies
and cooperatives which by statute are often exempt from regu-
lation, utilities operating in areas where there is no regulation,
and incidental utilities exempt from regulation. A large pro-
portion keep their accounts on a basis approximating that for364 PARTII
regulated utilities. Certain utilities keep no accounts worthy
of the name.
As in the case of regulated utilities, original cost minus de-
preciation reserve, the latter estimated if not available, would
seem to be a starting point. Adjustment to some current cost
basis would meet difficulties engenderedby obsolescence. The
approach to valuation would thus be the same for both regu-
lated and nonregulated utilities.
With respect to public utility value in general, we seem to
be in the unhappy situation of having to pick the 'least worst'
measure. The choice seems to be between original and repro-
duction cost.37 The latter, usually determined as an adjust-
ment to or revaluation of original cost, is subject to error;
original cost has the virtue of being a fact.88 Whatever inade-
quacy an original cost depreciation reserve may have, the
adjustment to current price levels or a given year's price level
introduces additional errors.
As yet a satisfactory method does not seem to have been de-
vised for adjusting for obsolescence, especially that occasioned
by changes in demand and advances in the arts.
In addition, there is the theoretical difficulty that reproduc-
tion cost is not a good measure of economic value for a mo-
nopoly industry, and, under certain conditions pertinent to
utilities, has an upward bias. Moreover, utility income is fixed
more and more on original cost, and when original cost is not
the sole criterion, it is the more important.
We seem to be left, more or less by default, with original
cost, not because original cost has fewer defects for our purpose
but because cost of reproduction has more. In stressing book,
or original cost, I do so with the full realization that account-
ing is in a sense more of an art than a science, and that I may be
In a rate case, legal precedent allows for a combination of or a compromise be-
tween the two, on the basis of judgment'. Within the limits of one
utility, such judgment can be meaningful. To exercise such judgment on an
industry-wide basis would be precarious.
38 I do not propose to argue how relevant this fact is for a particular regulatory
purpose. This paper considers the problem solely from the viewpoint of a
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making a fetish of mere accounting. Yet this 'mere accounting'
offers the only data we have for business analysis. And when
adjustment yields estimates with an indeterminate error, we
must beware of making a fetish of adjustment.
Perhaps I rationalize a vested interest in available data. How-
ever, for purposes of devising a national balance sheet as of a
recent date, original cost seems to provide the most meaningful
available estimate of public utility wealth.
Original cost has had an increasing significance as evidence
of 'fair value', and in many jurisdictions has come to be identi-
fied with 'fair value' almost as a matter of regulatory policy and
procedure. The same is true with respect to the depreciation
reserve as a measure of accrued capital consumption.
This statement is not intended to imply that book cost minus
depreciation reserve is universally used as a rate base by all
commissions, or by any commission all the time. However, I
believe this method is given most weight or even preference
by a majority of the commissions, and is applied to the major
portion of public utility assets.39 The statistical data presented
in this paper are on a book cost basis.
On net balance it is my opinion that for the public utility
39Ihave not made any exhaustive or precise statistical study to support this
belief. However, there are certain indications in addition to general knowledge
based on experience in the field. Tables A and B on pages 7 and 8 of State Com-
mission Jurisdiction and Regulation of Electric and Gas Utilities—1948, prepared
by the Federal Power Commission in cooperation with the National Association
of Railroad and Utilities Commissioners, constitute one bit of evidence.
My review of all utility decisions, commission and court, reported in the
Public Utility Fortnightty, January 2, 1947-April 8, 1948, revealed 29 cases that
could be counted as reflecting opinions concerning rate base. In 20 cases book or
original cost was used. In two of these a 5 percent allowance above such cost was
made to reflect of reproduction cost'; in a third a 2.5 percent
allowance was made. Of the other nine cases, four relate earnings to book cost,
and in addition relate earnings to investment as reflected by book figures. A
fifth uses an undepreciated rate base with a sinking fund depreciation; but since
that represented new equipment, there is no indication of what that particular
commission would prefer, except that about one year later, again with respect to
a small telephone company, it used book cost. The sixth of this group used cost
of reproduction depreciated; and the last three used combinations of various
elements.
Included in this tabulation are states such as Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, New366 PART II
sector of the economy not only is income a much more clearly
defined concept but also can be ascertained withamaterially
narrower margin of error.
H SUBJECTS FOR FUTURE CONSIDERATION
This paper contains many gaps, in both statistical data and
theoretical analysis, among which the following stand out:
1)The data on tangible assets that could be assembled in the
time at my disposal are disappointingly incomplete. Much bet-
ter coverage could have been attained by compiling balance
Jersey, Massachusetts, Maryland, Georgia, and Louisiana; the individual prop-
erties were by no means inconsequential—running as high as $185,000,000 on a
net depreciated basis. Not included in this review were the District of Columbia,
California, and the various federal regulatory commissions. Their inclusion
would have added to the bodies using book or original cost.
In the above statistical analysis, and throughout this paper, the term original
cost was not used in its strict sense as the cost to the person first devoting the
property to public use. Original cost, book cost, prudent investment, historical
cost, etc. were all used to mean about the same thing—the cost recorded on the
books, when the books were kept or have been substantially adjusted to current
and accepted uniform systems of account for public utilities. I am aware of dif-
ferences in meaning among these terms, differences that are, significant for cer-
tain purposes. However, for purposes of this paper and the estimation of national
wealth they are not too important.
I am aware of the argument that in the last few years utilities were in such
dire need of speedy rate increases that they based requirements on original cost
rate bases in order to remove the question of valuation from the area of con-
troversy. This is undoubtedly true to a certain, though unknown degree. How-
ever, it is doubtful that adjustment for this factor would reduce materially the
indication that original cost is the most significant, and at times the only, ele-
ment in determining fair value. Regardless why original cost was used, it is
sufficient to note that it was.
I appreciate also the position that the so-called annual charges on account of
depreciation expense (regardless whether based on a straight line or any other
method) may not and in many cases do not equal the actual' depreciation that
has materialized during the given year. In fact, the charges to depreciation
expense may represent no more than the amount of asset cost amortized during
the given accounting period, for the purpose of amortizing the cost of the assets
during their life in an acceptable, conventional, and systematic manner. How-
ever, to the extent such depreciation, or better, amortization has won acceptance
in regulatOry valuation policy and practice, it should be reflected in the utility
value. In this discussion we are concerned with what commissions do, rather
than with what they should do.TANGIBLE ASSETS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 367
sheet data from individual corporate reports published in
most instances in financial services such as Moody's, or in an-
nual statements to stockholders. Certain regulatory commis-
sions issue annual consolidated balance sheets for the utilities
under their jurisdiction, but not enough for national coverage.
Questionnaires sent directly to the utilities offer the sole means
of obtaining 100 percent coverage. Even this procedure would
fail to bring out all the data for a large number of small utility
operations rendering hauling, taxi, warehousing, and forward-
ing services, since many are not regulated but are merely
licensed and as such keep no adequate accounts. It might be
possible to obtain only an enumeration of physical assets; plac-
ing a net value on these might constitute a rough guess at best.
For government-owned utilities too, especially those providing
local transportation, water, sewers, etc., it might be necessary
to impute a value; accounting information, especially on de-
preciation, that would be necessary for valuation purposes is
often not available. To fill many of these gaps would require
a vast amount of work. Merely to collect complete raw data
would be a vast undertaking, not the least of which would be
to decide from whom and in what form to request data. This
may appear to be an unnecessarily detailed procedure, but I
know of no other feasible method that would assure complete
coverage or give a definitive estimate of coverage.
It was impossible, even for the data gathered, to divide assets
into reproducible and nonreproducible; that would have re-
quired going to individual corporate reports for the most part.
2)No information was elicited that would allow for the con-
solidation of claims. The obvious difficulty of obtaining such
data precluded also establishing an adequate basis upon which
such consolidation should be made. While data are at hand that
make possible some form of consolidation of railroad and tele-
phone securities, data for other utilities are not available with-
out considerable research. Many small utilities are not incor-
porated, and the claims approach becomes confusing. Of course
government-owned utilities present a unique situation 'in this
respect.368 PARTH
3)Because of time limitations no attempt was made to con-
struct indexes needed for restating original cost in terms of
prices as of any given date. Indexes can be obtained for certain
industries such as railroads and telephone companies. As I had
no opportunity to check their adequacy I cannot comment.
There is little doubt, however, that over-all indexes are of little
value. To be useful, indexes should be specific, dealing with
major categories of plant for each industry. Such detail, while
adding to accuracy, entails a lot of statistical labor. Some com-
promise is necessary. The general technique of adjusting an
original cost to either a current cost or cost-as-of-a-given-date
value is akin to that devised by Mr. Fabricant for adjusting
capital consumption.
4)Mr. Fabricant has worked out a general theory of price-
level adjustment of capital consumption, but in view of the
rapid in the utility arts and the consequent obsoles-
cence in utility plant, the problem of capital consumption can-
not be deemed completely solved even theoretically. Perhaps it
never will be. Meanwhile, it would be helpful if a method for
estimating the order of magnitude of the effect of such obsoles-
cence were devised. Such an estimate might indicate that I
have been straining at a gnat, but I think not.
5)Although for many industries the coverage is incomplete
in unknown degree, the data are adequate for computing sig-
nificant balance sheet ratios. For example, the ratio of current
assets to current liabilities, of fixed plant to total assets, of de-
preciation reserve to depreciable fixed plant, etc. afford useful
information. I had hoped to find time to derive these ratios
and discuss their implications. Such an analysis would have
been useful not only in high-lighting the internal structures of
the individual industries but also in showing their role in the
economy as a whole.
One note in closing; even after we have adequate data and
have made all the necessary and desirable adjustments, we are
still faced withthetask of ascertaining what Albert Hart has
termed 'motivating characteristics', the significant characteris-
tics of the balance sheet that will shed light on the workings ofTANGIBLE ASSETS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 369
each sector of the economy. Perhaps working with the data will
suggest the questions that may be answered and the additional
information needed to answer them. Having formulated the
questions, we can then come to a significant analysis of wealth.
APPENDIX A
Extent of Industry Coverage and Source of Basic Data
Group 7211 Line Haul Railroad Companies
Of the Line Haul Railroad Companies, Class I and Lessors
cover more than 99 percent of all railroad operations in the
United States. Complete data for this class are included in the
National Balance Sheet. For Class II and III Line Haul Rail-
road Companies and Lessors and for Electric Railroads, only
selected balance sheet items were available and are included.
Source: Statistics of Railways in the United States, ICC, 1946
(worksheets).
Group 7221 Switching and Terminal Companies
For Class I and Lessor Switching and Terminal Companies
data are complete, but for Class II and III and Lessors only
selected balance sheet items could be obtained. Depreciation
reserve for Class II and III and Lessors was estimated.
Source: Ibid.
Groups 7231 and 7241 Pullman Company and Railway Ex-
Service
Data for the Pullman Company and Railway Express Service
are complete.
Source: Ibid.
Groups 7421 and 7521 Motor Carriers
It is estimated that the data cover about 70 percent of inter-
state carriers of passengers and freight. No estimate of wholly
intrastate carriers was found.
Source: Statistics of Class I Motor Carriers, ICC, 1946 (proof
sheets).370 PARTII
Group 76 Water Carriers
The only exclusions are water carriers operating within a
single harbor or between places in contiguous harbors, craft
under 100 tons or 100 horsepower, ferries, passenger vessels
with a capacity of fewer than 17, carriers operating wholly
intrastate other than those operating on regular routes on the
Great Lakes, and tank and bulk carriers. It is estimated that
the majority of tank and bulk carriers are owned by steel or
oil companies, so that investment is reflected in the balance
sheets of those industries.
The 1945 data are distorted by the wartime requisitioning
of vessels, subject to later repurchase.
Source: Composite Condensed Balance Sheet as of December
31, 1945, Maritime Commission (preliminary worksheets), and
Statistics of Railways in the United States, ICC, 1945. Data
adjusted to exclude reporting duplications.
Group 7711 Airline Carriers
Scheduled domestic carriers alone included; feeder lines and
all unscheduled carriers of cargo and passengers excluded.
Source: Domestic Air Carriers, Comparative Statement of Bal-
ance Sheet Data as of December 31, 1946 and 1945, Civil Aero-
nautics Board.
Group 78 Pipe Line Carriers
All interstate common carriers of oil and other commodities,
other than water and natural gas, included; pipe line depart-
ments of oil companies excluded.
Source: Statistics of Oil Pipe Line Companies Reporting to the
Interstate Commerce Commission, ICC, 1946.
Group 801 Freight Forwarders
An estimated 90 percent of interstate forwarders covered.
Source: Selected Financial and Operating Statistics of Freight
Forwarders for 1946, ICC (worksheets).
Group 8111 Telephone
95-98 percent of all telephone companies in the United States
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Source: Statistics of the Communications Industry in the
United States, FCC, 1946 (worksheets).
Group 8121 Telegraph
Substantially the entire wire telegraph, ocean cable, and radio
telegraph industry covered.
Source: Statistics of the Communications Industry in the
United States, FCC, 1946 (worksheets).
Group 8131 Radio Broadcasting
Data on radio broadcasting do not adequately cover the indus-
try. Television and frequency-modulation are wholly ex-
cluded.
Source: Financial and Employee Data Respecting Networks
and Standard Broadcast Stations, FCC, 1946 (preliminary
worksheets).
Group 8211 Electric
More than 98 percent of the privately-owned electric light'and
power industry included. No data are available for the pub-
[icly-owned portion of the industry, but the original cost minus
depreciation of such utility plant was estimated.
Source: Statistics of Electric Utilities in the United States,
1946, Federal Power Commission.
Group 82 Gas
Degree of coverage unknown.
Source: American Gas Association (unpublished material).372 PARTII
National Balance Sheet, 1946, Exhibit II
Public Utilities
(millions of dollars)
DebtorsIssuers of Stock Gross Total
I Short term claims on & liabilities of:
1 Credit institutions
a) Private institutions
b) Federal government corporations & credit agencies
2 Public utilities 6,055k






a) Private nonprofit institutions
b) The rest of government
9 Households
10 Total
II Long term claims on & liabilities of:
1 Credit institutions
a) Private institutions
b) Federal government corporations & credit agencies
2 Public utilities 21,808"






a) Private nonprofit institutions
b) The rest of government
9 Households
10 Total
III Stock issued by:
1 Private credit institutions
2 Public utilities 20,297c
3 Manufacturing & trade corporations
4 Mining corporations
5 Other domestic corporations
6 Foreign corporations
7 Total
Excludes Class II and III railroads and lessors, Class II and III switching and
terminal companies and lessors, radio broadcasting, and publicly-owned electric
utilities.
bExcludesradio broadcasting and publicly-owned electric utilities.
Excludes Class I motor carriers, with an aggregate corporate and noncorporate
capital of $234 million; all water carriers not tiling with the ICC, with an aggre-
gate corporate and noncorporate capital and surplus of $622 million; and stock




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































It will be noted that there are three 'Total' columns for each
industry. The 'Total Each Line' is the aggregate of the values
on that line for each industry. However, for certain industries
either the values for a particular item were not available or
values could be definitely classified only as within a group of
items or lines. The 'Total Subgroups' aggregate the values for
particular items and the values for items classifiable oniy
within a group of items. The 'Total Groups' is the third step,
aggregating values for individual lines, values classified in
subgroups, and overlapping subgroups or values classifiable
only as included within the group.
Since Urban Transit (Industry 73 and 7411) is excluded
from the totals and the extent of coverage of each industry is
only as defined by reference to Appendix A, the figures best
representing aggregate Public Utility Balance Sheet data are:
Item IA, Assets for Holders, $14,421 million. This figure ex-
cludes Radio Broadcasting (Industry 8131), Publicly-Owned
Electric Utilities (Industry 8211), and some assets of Class II
and III Railroads and Lessors, Electric Railways (Industry
7211), and of Class II and III Switching and Terminal Com-
panies (Industry 7221).
Item I B, Liabilities and Proprietorship for Holders, $57,295
million. This figure has the same exclusions and partial exclu-
sions as the preceding.
Item II, Reproducible Assets in the United States, $43,908
million. This figure totals the Line Total of Item II 10 ($56,470
million) Class II and HI Railroads and Lessors, and Class II
and III Switching and Terminal Companies and Lessors, for
which partial information only was available; Land and Sub-
soil Assets, classifiable under Item III, are included.
Item 1/, Total Assets Other than Claims, $44,218 million. This
figure totals the Line Total of Item V, plus the partial data forTANGIBLE ASSETS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 377
Reproducible Assets included in Class II and Ill Railroads
and Lessors, Electric Railways, Class II and III Switching and
Terminal Companies and Lessors, Water Carriers Reporting
to the ICC, Radio Broadcasting, and Publicly-Owned Electric
Utilities.